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In recent years, controversy has arisen over whether the owner of a
work of art has a duty to protect it from destruction, defacement, or other
forms of mutilation.' Because current law has failed to address the issue in
a satisfactory manner, artwork with significant historical, cultural, and
educational value has been damaged or destroyed.2 For example, in the
late 1960's, New York State purchased a large number of valuable mod-
ern paintings for exhibition in the state museum and at the Albany Mall.
By 1977, due to improper installation and insufficient upkeep, much of
the work at the Mall had been seriously damaged.3 Although that damage
1. For example, considerable controversy arose when a real estate developer purposely destroyed
artistically valuable bas-relief sculptures in the course of demolishing a New York City building. See,
e.g., Builder Says Costs Forced Scrapping of Bon wit Art, N.Y. Times, June 9, 1980, at B3, cols. 4, 5
(destruction of Bonwit sculptures "shocked" art appraisers); Crumbling Patrimony, N.Y. Times,
June 15, 1980, § 4 (Week in Review), at 20, cols. 1, 2 (Editorial) ("New York needs to make
salvation of this kind of landmark mandatory and stop expecting that its developers will be good
citizens and good sports."); Developer Scraps Bonwit Sculptures, N.Y. Times, June 6, 1980, at Al,
B5, cols. 1, 3-4 (reporting "disappointment and surprise" of Metropolitan Museum officials that Bon-
wit sculptures destroyed instead of, as earlier promised, donated to Metropolitan Museum); Grillwork
Missing at Bonwit Building, N.Y. Times, June 7, 1980, at 23, col. 2 (public outcry over loss of
sculptures); Requiem for a New York Art Work, N.Y. Times, June 14, 1980, at 22, cols. 3, 4 (letters
to editor) (outrage that law permitted Bonwit sculptures to be destroyed; America's cultural heritage
should be preserved). In another instance, a public dispute arose over the condition of a prize-winning
Alexander Calder mobile when its owner destroyed the effect of the piece by painting it another color,
immobilizing it, and spinning it from an electric motor. After an art museum trustee "charged that the
mobile's integrity had been violated," and after much national publicity, the owner was persuaded to
restore the mobile to its original condition. Mobilizing for Pittsburgh, ARTNEWS, Apr. 1978, at 26.
See also Failing, The Maryhill Museum: A Case History of Cultural Abuse, ARTINVS, Mar. 1977,
at 83 (concern over deterioration of two Rodin collections of international importance led to investiga-
tions and lawsuits); Hess, The Mess in Albany, NEW YORK, Nov. 28, 1977, at 83, 86 (New York
State "must accept a measure of responsibility" when valuable artwork that it owns is damaged).
2. See, e.g., Kramer, Altering of Smith Work Stirs Dispute, N.Y. Times, Sept. 13, 1974, at 28,
col. I (criticism of stripping of paint off sculptor David Smith's artwork after his death); Kramer,
Questions Raised by Art Alterations, N.Y. Times, Sept. 14, 1974, at 25, col. 1 (same); Sussman, It's
Student vs. Hopkins in Dispute Over Disposal of Old Books and Manet Prints, Baltimore Sun,
Mar. 9, 1980 (Magazine), at 14 (university library allegedly attempted to destroy Manet and Dela-
croix engravings it owned in order to make space for other library activities); A Miro in Trouble,
N.Y. Times, May 9, 1981, at 22, col. 4 (letter to editor) (dilapidation of Miro tapestry); see also note
1 supra (describing instances of purposeful and negligent destruction of or injury to artwork); note 8
infra (describing instances of purposeful dismemberment of artwork). As the above examples show,
market forces do not always prevent owners from doing injury to their artwork.
3. For example, three panels comprising one painting by Al Held were "brutally cropped" and
mismatched upon installation, which ruined the painting's meaning, and were permitted to sustain
unrepaired abrasions and scratches. Hess, supra note 1, at 84. See also note 9 infra (discussing dam-
age to Kenneth Noland painting at same exhibit).
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constituted a cultural scandal,4 there was no way to compel restoration of
the work.5
This Note offers two independent legal strategies to help preserve the
integrity of culturally valuable artwork. First, it develops a new theory,
based on the American common-law doctrine of public dedication, which
courts could adopt in order to protect certain types of important artwork
from both negligent and intentional injury. This common-law approach,
unlike European doctrines that safeguard artwork by protecting artists'
rights, is premised on the existence of a public interest and a public trust
in the artwork itself. Second, the Note proposes a statutory approach to
protecting artwork that could supplement the common-law method. It ar-
gues that the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA) should protect
some artwork from injury by promulgating regulations that empower the
agency to assert a public interest in the integrity of the works of visual art
that it funds.6
I. The Basis for Asserting a Public Interest in the Integrity of Works of
Art
In the past, American courts have considered the problem of protecting
artwork from injury and mutilation primarily in terms of protecting art-
ists' rights. Artists' rights doctrines, however, do not adequately safeguard
the public interest in art. Some of these doctrines have been rejected by
American courts, and others are impractical. In addition, such doctrines
respond only to the concerns of individual artists, instead of addressing the
needs of the public. The common-law doctrine of public dedication, on the
other hand, can provide a basis for protecting the public interest in art
because it is specifically designed to safeguard public interests in private
property.
4. Hess, supra note 1, at 83. Damage to important artwork injures the quality of life. C Penn
Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 108 (1978) (historic and cultural landmarks
enhance quality of life for all); Lutheran Church v. City of New York, 35 N.Y.2d 121, 134 n.4, 316
N.E.2d 305, 314 n.4, 359 N.Y.S.2d 7, 19 n.4 (1974) (Jasen J., dissenting) ("Historic preservation
promotes aesthetic values by adding to the variety, the beauty, and the quality of life.")
5. The only method suggested for assuring repair of the Held painting was that the legislature
appropriate money for restoration. Hess, supra note 1, at 86. For a discussion of the inability of
current law to preserve artwork, see pp. 123-26 infra.
6. The categories of protection offered by this Note are not mutually exclusive. They achieve
similar results, but differ in inclusiveness and in the ease with which they could be adopted. The
common-law method of protection, see 131-40 infra, could be adopted more easily because it depends
only upon favorable action by individual courts. This method would not, however, be geographically
comprehensive. Administrative regulations promulgated by the NEA, see pp. 140-43 infra, would be
uniform throughout the country and would expand the field of protected art, but would probably
require some political support to adopt. Maximum protection could be afforded to artwork of national
significance by enacting comprehensive federal legislation modeled on historic preservation laws. This
Note does not discuss such a legislative approach, however, because enactment of such legislation
seems unlikely.
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A. Inadequate Current Approaches
Artwork needs protection from various kinds of injury. It may be de-
stroyed totally,7 or it may be subjected to other serious physical abuses
either purposely' or negligently.9 Such injury is especially unfortunate0
because there is, at present, no way to force an owner who has caused the
damage either to restore the artwork to its original condition or to refrain
from further injuring the work."
Visual artists 2 occasionally have made unsuccessful attempts to sue to
prevent the mutilation or destruction of their artwork, basing their claims
on the European doctrine of the "droit moral." In Europe, the droit moral
gives the artist a right to protect his creation by controlling and preventing
any modification of it." In America, however, attempts by artists to pre-
vent the destruction or mutilation of their creations through the droit
moral have failed. In some cases, the foreign terminology and the absence
7. See, e.g., Sussman, supra note 2 (library accused of attempting to destroy Manet and Delacroix
engravings by throwing them in trash compactor in order to provide space for other activities).
8. Surprising as it may seem, it is far from unheard of for owners purposely to alter or dismember
their artwork, often out of modesty or because of other personal preferences. Poussin's Venus and the
Liberal Arts, for example, was cut into sections and some of the naked figures were draped. Failing,
Picking Up the Pieces: The Case of the Dismembered Masterpieces, ARTNEwS, Sept. 1980, at 68,
74. See also Roeder, infra note 13, at 554; notes 1 & 2 supra. For a thorough, historical review of
purposely destroyed and mutilated artwork in Europe, see UNESCO, AN ILLUSTRATED INVENTORY OF
FAMOUS DISMEMBERED WORKS OF ART (1974).
9. For instance, the same negligence that caused the damage to the Al Held painting at the Al-
bany Mall, described in note 3 supra, also resulted in injury to other artwork there. One Kenneth
Noland canvas, for example, was taken off its stretchers and glued permanently to a wall, making it
"impossible to remove for standard curatorial inspections," and later, during an ethnic food fair held
in the space in front of the painting, "price tags for various menus were stuck to the canvas." Hess,
supra note 1, at 83. See also notes 1 & 2 supra.
10. Injury to artwork is pointless because there generally is no economic incentive for an owner to
destroy or mutilate artwork. But see Failing, supra note 8, at 71 (owner of two Toulouse-Lautrec
paintings cut them into 10 pieces because he hoped to sell parts more easily than whole). Thus, most
of the injury to artwork described in this Note results from negligent treatment, or is due to personal
preferences or artistic ignorance.
11. In the case of the damage to the Al Held painting, New York State rebuffed the artist's offers
to repair the work. Held spent "three years trying to correct the situation. He offered] to come to
Albany and repaint the picture, to fix the seams and interconnections, with no fee-just reimburse-
ment of out-of-pocket expenses . . . . Instead of an apology and a grateful invitation, Held [got]
runarounds and screaming matches." Hess, supra note 1, at 84. See also Crumbling Patrimony, supra
note 1, § 4, at 20, col. I (current law mistakenly relies on owner's good faith to protect important
cultural objects from injury); Requiem for a New York Art Work, supra note 1, at 22, cols. 3, 4
(same).
12. In the context of this Note, the term "visual artist" is used to describe a creator who produces
objects that are meant to be permanent and are designed primarily to be experienced through vision.
13. In one German case, for example, the droit moral enabled an artist to prevent an owner from
hiring another painter to drape nude figures in a mural. Roeder, The Doctrine of Moral Right: A
Study in the Law of Artists, Authors and Creators, 53 HARV. L. REV. 554, 554 (1940). For discus-
sions of the droit moral, see Diamond, Legal Protection for the "Moral Rights" of Authors and other
Creators, 68 TRADEMARK REP. 244, 256-57 (1978); Merryman, The Refrigerator of Bernard Buffet,
27 HASTINGS L.J. 1023, 1027 (1976); Sarraute, Current Theory on the Moral Right of Authors and
Artists Under French Law, 16 AM. J. COMP. L. 465, 480 (1968).
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of domestic precedent have led courts to reject the doctrine;"4 in others,
courts have disapproved of the basic concept of allowing the artist perpet-
ual control over his artwork. 5
Although possible American common-law analogs to the droit moral do
exist, these "artists' rights" approaches do not provide a viable means of
protecting artwork. 6 First, courts may be reluctant to embrace the analogs
because they are based on the same substantive notions as the droit moral.
Second, in practice, these analogs could not adequately protect the art-
work. For example, one analog would permit an artist to bring an action
for defamation against a person who mutilated the work, on the grounds
that the distortion injured the artist's reputation and goodwill. 7 But prov-
ing that the distortion was in fact defamatory because it held him "up to
hatred, contempt or ridicule, or . .. cause[d] him to be shunned or
avoided""8 would be difficult. 9 In addition, injunctive relief to protect or
restore the mutilated painting would not be available.20 Because other
American varieties of the artists' rights approach suffer from similar infir-
14. 'See, e.g., Vargas v. Esquire, Inc., 164 F.2d 522, 526 (7th Cir. 1947) (refusing to recognize
"so-called moral rights," whether or not recognition would be desirable, because to do so would
change American law to conform to European doctrines); Crimi v. Rutgers Presbyterian Church, 194
Misc. 570, 89 N.Y.S.2d 813 (1949) (refusing to embrace doctrine of moral rights because doctrine
"has not yet received acceptance in the law of the United States") (quoting S. LADAS, 2 THE INTER.
NATIONAL PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC PROPERTY § 367, at 802 (1938).
15. See Granz v. Harris, 198 F.2d 585, 590 (2d Cir. 1952) (Frank, J., concurring) (moral right
doctrine includes very extensive rights that American courts are not yet prepared to acknowledge);
Meliodon v. Philadelphia School Dist., 328 Pa. 457, 460, 195 A. 905, 906 (1938) (implicitly disap-
proving doctrine that would give artists control over artwork after sale).
16. In a few cases, courts have given a film producer a right to protect the integrity of his movie
when it is threatened with excessive editing for television. See Treece, American Law Analogues of
the Author's "Moral Right," 16 AM. J. COMP. L. 487, 496-98 (1968). These cases only suggest,
however, that when interpreting contracts that carefully spell out the rights of each party, the absence
of a provision expressly allowing editing does not permit a user of the film to mutilate it grossly.
Moreover, even an action brought under such a theory has, at best, an uncertain chance of success. Id.
at 499. In any event, the public, as opposed to the artist's, interest in the integrity of artwork would
not be protected by this line of cases.
California has enacted a limited statutory version of the artists' rights doctrine that gives visual
artists the right to enjoin or to recover damages from a person who has intentionally mutilated the
artist's creation. CAL. CIV. CODE § 987 (West Supp. 1981).
17. "In the area of artistic creation, there is an action for defamation when one exploits a dis-
torted version of a work which tends to injure its creator's reputation 'by diminishing his public
esteem, respect, goodwill or confidence.'" Comment, Toward Artistic Integrity: Implementing Moral
Right Through Extension of Existing Legal Doctrines, 60 GEO. L.J. 1539, 1548 (1972) (quoting S.
BOWER, ACTIONABLE DEFAMATION 4 (2d ed. 1923)).
18. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 739 (4th ed. 1971). See Meliodon v. Phila-
delphia School Dist., 328 Pa. 457, 460, 195 A. 905, 906 (1938) (careful reading of complaint in suit
brought at equity for distortion of sculptures showed that principal damage alleged was injury to
artist's reputation).
19. Well-known artists would have to overcome significant burdens over and above the factual
burdens that actions for defamation always entail. They would be "public figures" who could recover
for defamation "only upon a clear and convincing showing of the defendant's knowledge or reckless
disregard of the falsity of the defamatory publication." L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
§ 12-13, at 639 (1978) (discussing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974)).
20. Diamond, supra note 13, at 264.
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mities of proof, remedy, or applicability,"' traditional American common-
law rights are inadequate to protect an artist's interests in the integrity of
his artwork.22
Even if these artists' rights approaches were practical, however, they
could never adequately protect the public interest in important artwork.
They focus primarily on protecting the artist's rights in his work, rather
than on protecting the much broader public interest in the artwork itself.13
For example, these doctrines depend on rights that are personal to and
inalienable from each individual artist, 4 and therefore can be enforced
only by the aggrieved artist or, sometimes, his heirs.2 This limitation, of
course, makes it virtually impossible to protect older art. In addition, art-
ists' rights doctrines do not protect artwork from destruction, as opposed
to mutilation.26 Mutilation of artwork, when the artist is identified, mis-
21. For example, an artist could bring an action for invasion of privacy against the person respon-
sible for mutilation of his work. The claim would be based upon the theory that the right of privacy
"includes the individual's right to protect the proprietary interest in his reputation." Comment, supra
note 17, at 1548. This approach, however, would not protect the work of any important or publicly
known artist, id. at 1548 n.59, which is precisely the type of work that the public has an interest in
protecting.
22. For a discussion of various American analogs to the droit moral, such as breach of contract,
copyright infringement, libel, and unfair competition, along with the infirmities of those doctrines, see
Diamond, supra note 13, at 259-71, 281 (concluding that "the barriers to enforcement of moral rights
under state . . .[and federal law] would seem to preclude a satisfactory solution to the moral rights
problem in the United States by any means short of specific federal legislation"). See also Maslow,
Droit Moral and Sections 43(a) and 44(i) of the Lanham Act-A Judicial Shell Game? 48 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 377 (1980); Comment, supra note 17, at 1548-56.
23. The artists' rights doctrine, for example, does not answer the complaint of the Mayor of the
City of New York "that developers had a 'moral responsibility to consider the interests of the people
of the city,'" which was voiced after a real estate developer in the course of demolishing a building
jackhammered some bas-relief sculptures that had been sought by the Metropolitan Museum of Art.
Grillwork Missing at Bonwit Building, supra note 1, at 23, col. 3. Public reaction to the loss of these
sculptures was intense: "The loss of the sculptures were [sic] decried by planning officials, civic groups
and even the architect who designed the . . .[replacement] tower that is to be built on the site." Id.;
"The destruction of. . .the sculptures is an act of vandalism which is all too indicative of the value
we. . .place on our cultural heritage. . . . The crime outrages us all the more when we realize that
its perpetrators have acted with an impunity that is guaranteed them by law." Requiem for a New
York Art Work, supra note 1, at 22, col. 3.
24. Merryman, supra note 13, at 1025; Strauss, The Moral Right of the Author, 4 AM. J. COMP.
L. 506, 515-17 (1955). Moral rights derive from "the unbreakable bond between the personality of
the artist and his work." Comment, supra note 17, at 1562.
25. See The California Art Preservation Act, CAL. CIV. CODE § 987(g)(1) (West Supp. 1981)
(artist may enforce his own moral rights, and they may also be enforced by his heirs, legatees, or
personal representative until the fiftieth anniversary of his death); Roeder, supra note 13, at 574-75
(describing which components of the artist's moral right can be enforced by the artist alone, and which
can also be enforced by his heirs); Strauss, supra note 24, at 517-18 (same). In some European
countries the right to sue to protect the artist's droit moral has been extended by statute beyond the
family and descendants of the artist to bodies charged with protecting the nation's artwork. Roeder,
supra note 13, at 575.
26. See Crimi v. Rutgers Presbyterian Church, 194 Misc. 570, 573, 89 N.Y.S.2d 813, 816-17
(" 'The right to prevent defamation does not include the right to prevent destruction of a created
work.' ") (quoting Roeder, supra note 13, at 569). But see Merryman, supra note 13, at 1035 (issue
of whether total destruction violates moral right not totally resolved; on balance argument that it does
"seems persuasive").
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represents the artist to the public, thereby damaging his reputation. 7 Out-
right destruction or mutilation of artwork to the point that the artist can-
not be identified, however, does not violate the droit moral-there is no
danger that such destruction will misrepresent the artist or invade his pri-
vacy by subjecting him to excessive criticism or ridicule.
28
B. The Theory of Common-Law Dedication
The theory of public dedication of land could provide a basis for the
development of a doctrine to protect the public interest in artwork. Public
dedication is a well-established method of asserting public rights in pri-
vate property. It balances the public welfare, not merely the rights of an
individual artist, against the rights of an individual owner of art.
1. The Operation and Consequences of the Doctrine of Public
Dedication
Under the common-law doctrine of public dedication, the public can
acquire rights to property useful to promote its welfare. The doctrine is
based on combined principles of gift and contract law. 29 Its basic compo-
nents are offer and acceptance.30 If an owner offers a use of his property
to the public, and if the public accepts that offer, the property will be
considered dedicated. A public interest in it will be established although
no consideration has passed."
Public dedication cases define the terms "offer" and "acceptance" in an
27. See Roeder, supra note 13, at 569 (deformation of artwork subjects an artist to criticism for
work not attributable to him and thus injures his honor and reputation).
28. Cf. Granz v. Harris, 198 F.2d 585, 588 (2d Cir. 1952) (defendant could lawfully abbreviate
plaintiff's musical recording and sell shortened version as long as the shortened version was not attrib-
uted to plaintiff).
29. The doctrine is based on contract law in that offer and acceptance are required, see note 30
infra, and it is based on gift principles in that no consideration is required, see note 31 infra. See
generally Note, Public Ownership of Land Through Dedication, 75 HARV. L. REv. 1406, 1406-07
(1962) (some courts analogize dedication to contract law without requirement of consideration, some
analogize it to gift, and some analogize it to estoppel). Although there has been some confusion over
the theoretical origins of the doctrine, "the distinction has lost all practical importance and the court's
choice of theory will not be dispositive of any given case." Id. at 1407; see also 4 H. TIFFANY, THE
LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 1110, at 629 (3d ed. 1975) ("For the purpose of the particular case the
confusion [over the conceptual basis of the doctrine] is immaterial. .. .")
30. Horsham Township v. Weiner, 435 Pa. 35, 255 A.2d 126 (1969) (required elements of dedi-
cation are offer and acceptance); see 6A R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 1 926[2], at 84-85
(P. Rohan rev. ed. 1980) (same).
31. 6A R. POWELL, supra note 30, T 926[2] n.19, at 84-85; Note, supra note 29, at 1406.
The fact that the dedicator traditionally retains title to dedicated land distinguishes dedication from
adverse possession and prescription. See 6A R. POWELL, supra note 30, 92613], at 84-102 (public
typically obtains only easement in dedicated land, with fee left in dedicator). Another feature that
distinguishes public dedication from adverse possession and prescription is that public dedication is
based on offer and acceptance, and therefore does not require adverse use for a particular length of
time. Courts, however, sometimes confuse the doctrines, or infer the existence of an offer on the basis
of public use for a specified number of years.
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informal, flexible manner. 2 For example, an express invitation to the
public to use property constitutes an offer;33 so can a grant of property to
a public body. 4 Even mere acquiescence by the owner in public use of
property for a period of time can constitute an offer.3 In short, when a
particular piece of property serves an important public use, courts are
eager to construe circumstances to infer the existence of the required offer
and acceptance. 6 As long as the property is "thrown open" to the public
to use in some manner, an intent and an offer to dedicate can be implied. 7
This liberal approach to defining the components of public dedication law
developed because of the public policy objectives underlying the doctrine. 8
For example, in cases involving beachfront property, courts have favored
finding an offer and acceptance because of "the need for more public rec-
reational areas and the desire to avoid public expense by fulfilling this
need with private 'donations.' ""
Once public dedication has been found, no owner of the prop-
erty-present or future-will be permitted to defeat or interfere with the
public right to use it for its dedicated purposes.40 Dedicated property is
32. See Miller v. Schoten, 273 N.W.2d 757, 762 (S.D. 1979) ("no hard and fast rule can be laid
down" to determine whether implied dedication has taken place) (quoting Evans v. City of Brookings,
41 S.D. 225, 229, 170 N.W. 133, 134 (1918)); 6A R. POWELL, supra note 30, 1 926[1], at 84-82
(processes by which dedication is accomplished may be informal); Note, Public Access to Beaches, 22
STAN. L. REV. 564, 573 (1979) (no formalities necessary to constitute dedication).
33. E.g., Breslin v. Gray, 301 Ky. 739, 743, 193 S.W.2d 143, 145 (1946) (finding offer to dedi-
cate on basis of endorsement on plat that "[t]he streets and alleys as herein shown are hereby dedi-
cated to the public use").
34. See Village of Villa Park v. Wanderer's Rest Cemetery Co., 316 Ill. 226, 228, 147 N.E. 104,
105 (1925) (deed conveying land as cemetery is dedication for such purpose).
35. E.g., Gion v. City of Santa Cruz, 2 Cal. 3d 29, 38, 465 P.2d 50, 55, 84 Cal. Rptr. 162, 167
(1970) (owner's acquiesence in public use of beach for more than five years established dedication).
36. Although some courts, at least in dicta, require that an owner show some unequivocal intent
to offer his land to the public, see, e.g., Anderson v. Felten, 612 P.2d 216, 218 (Nev. 1980), when
faced with a situation in which an important public use is at stake, courts usually interpret otherwise
ambiguous actions in order to protect the public interest, see, e.g., Rainier Ave. Corp. v. Seattle, 80
Wash. 2d 362, 367, 494 P.2d 996, 999, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 983 (1972) ("It is. . . a salutary rule
to resolve doubts against the dedicator, and within reasonable limits, to construe dedications so as to
benefit the public rather than the dedicator."); Albee v. Town of Yarrow Point, 74 Wash. 2d 453,
457, 445 P.2d 340, 343 (1968) (even if dedicator did not intend to extend dedication of road to provide
access to navigable water, "the law will presume that . . . [the dedication] was [intended] because it
should have been"); 6A R. POWELL, supra note 30, 1 926[2], at 84-86 n.21 (collecting cases).
37. E.g., Cincinnati v. Lessee of White, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 431, 440 (1832) (if owner "throws open"
his property to public it will be presumed dedicated unless he affirmatively reserves his rights in it)
(citing Rex v. Lloyd, 1 Camp. 260, 262 (K.B. 1910)); Seaway Co. v. Attorney Gen., 375 S.W.2d 923,
936 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963) ("The act of throwing open property to the public use, without any other
formality, is sufficient to establish the fact of dedication to the public.")
38. See 6A R. POWELL, supra note 30, 1 926 [2], at 84-85 to 84-87 (law of dedication is consider-
ably elastic because although some courts require showing of unequivocal desire to part with land,
other courts liberally construe ambiguous transactions since dedication increases the public inventory);
pp. 128-29 infra.
39. Note, This Land is My Land: The Doctrine of Implied Dedication and Its Application to
California Beaches, 44 So. CAL. L. REV. 1092, 1092 (1971).
40. "Dedication has been viewed as in the nature of an irrevocable covenant running with the
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considered to be held in trust by the owner for the public even though no
trust instrument has been executed.' The owner is deemed to be a
fiduciary of the public with respect to the dedicated use of the property; as
such, he may not divert the property to a use inconsistent with that of the
public." This public trust principle applies whether the owner is a private
person or a municipality.
4 3
2. The Growth of Public Dedication in the United States
Strong public policy objectives have long been the principal, critical ele-
ments in the development and expansion of public dedication doctrine in
the United States. In its original English form, the doctrine applied only
to roadways.44 The public interest in facilitating commerce and travel nat-
urally encouraged the growth of a public trust theory in regard to such
property. In addition, because public use of the property could easily be
measured, the theory was self-limiting in its application and therefore not
very threatening to property owners. 5
In the United States, the law of public dedication was extended beyond
its English origins to apply to many kinds of property of interest to the
land . . . ." 4 H. TIFFANY, supra note 29, § 1112, at 638. E.g., Cincinnati v. Lessee of White, 31
U.S. (6 Pet.) 431 (1832) (dedication of property continued to be effective although ownership changed
hands many times); Gewirtz v. City of Long Beach, 69 Misc. 2d 763, 773, 330 N.Y.S.2d 495, 507
(1972), aft'd, 45 A.D.2d 841, 358 N.Y.S.2d 957 (1974) ("Once a dedication has become complete it is
irrevocable.")
41. Courts generally refer to the duty of the owner of dedicated property as that of a public
trustee. "[T]here is a very close 'kinship between trusts and dedications. . . .' [D]edication cases have
specifically talked in terms of the title being held 'in trust' [for the public] for the purpose of dedica-
tion," State v. Cooper, 24 N.J. 261, 276, 131 A.2d 756, 764, cert. denied, 355 U.S. 829 (1957)
(Commissioner v. First Nat'l Bank 46 Pa. D. & C. 619, 623 (1943)). See id. at 266-67, 131 A.2d at
759 (land dedicated to park use cannot be freely alienated from such use because it is held in trust for
public; municipality has interest in nature of "secondary title" to land, also held in trust for property's
dedicated purposes).
42. See Bryant v. Gustafson, 230 Minn. 1, 10-11, 40 N.W.2d 427, 434 (1950) (dedicated land is
owned subject to trust for its dedicated purposes); Hill v. Borough of Belmar, 3 N.J. Misc. 254, 256,
127 A. 789, 790-91 (1925) (both legal and "secondary" titleholders of land dedicated for use as park
hold property in trust for public and cannot divert property from that use); 6A R. POWELL, supra
note 30, 926[3], at 84-102 (owner of dedicated land can use property in any manner "not inconsis-
tent with the public easement").
43. See, e.g., City and County of Denver v. Publix Cab Co., 135 Colo. 132, 139, 308 P.2d 1016,
1020 (1957) (dedication can be made by municipal corporation as well as by private owner; when city
dedicated approach to airport to public, it held that property in trust for the use of the public);
Gewirtz v. City of Long Beach, 69 Misc. 2d 763, 769, 330 N.Y.S.2d 495, 504 (1972), afl'd, 45
A.D.2d 841, 358 N.Y.S.2d 957 (1974) (dedication can be made by municipal corporation as well as
by private person).
44. 6A R. POWELL, supra note 30, 926[1], at 84-83; Note, The American Extension of the
Doctrine of Dedication, 16 HARV. L. REV. 128, 128 (1902).
45. Cf Degnan, Public Rights in Ocean Beaches: A Theory of Prescription, 24 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 935, 953 (1973) (public rights in property develop on basis of similarity of property to roadway;
road-like use of property makes easement easily identifiable and public importance of property readily
ascertainable).
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public." Even in early cases, the doctrine was applied broadly, and
the courts emphasized the effect of the doctrine on public welfare. In
1832, for example, the Supreme Court invoked the doctrine to prevent a
landowner from interfering with the public's use of property as a com-
mon, because to do otherwise "would be destructive of public conven-
ience .... -41
The expansion of public dedication doctrine has continued recently in
cases involving beachfront property."' These cases explicitly refer to the
public policy basis for applying the dedication doctrine.4 9 As one court
remarked, "[e]ven if we were reluctant to apply the rules of common law
dedication to open recreational areas, we must observe the strong policy
expressed in the Constitution and statutes of this state of encouraging
public use of shoreline recreational areas."50 This trend of expanding pub-
lic dedication law in response to modem public interests provides Ameri-
can courts with a common-law basis for developing a theory of public
rights in important works of art.
II. The Public's Common-Law Right to the Visual Integrity of Works
of Art
Just as public dedication doctrine expanded from its narrow beginnings
to take account of public recreational interests, the doctrine should expand
46. 6A R. POWELL, supra note 30, 1 92611], at 84-83; 4 H. TIFFANY, supra note 29, § 1098, at
562-64; Note, supra note 44, at 128. For example, in the United States, the theory of public dedica-
tion is applicable to parks, see, e.g., Herron v. Boggs, 582 S.W.2d 643 (Ky. 1979); Birmingham Park
Improvement Ass'n v. Rosso, 356 Mich. 88, 95 N.W.2d 885 (1959), to cemeteries, see, e.g., Haserlig
v. Watson, 205 Ga. 668, 54 S.E.2d 413 (1949); Smith v. Ladage, 397 Ill. 336, 74 N.E.2d 497 (1947),
to utility lines, see, e.g., Horsham Township v. Weiner, 435 Pa. 35, 255 A.2d 126 (1969), and to
flood control areas, see, e.g., Toney Schloss Properties Corp. v. Berenholtz, 243 Md. 195, 220 A.2d
910 (1966).
47. City of Cincinnati v. Lessee of White, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 431, 438 (1832).
48. See, e.g., Gion v. City of Santa Cruz, 2 Cal. 3d 29, 465 P.2d 50, 84 Cal. Rptr. 162 (1970);
Gewirtz v. City of Long Beach, 69 Misc. 2d 763, 330 N.Y.S.2d 495 (1972), alfd, 45 A.2d 841, 358
N.Y.S.2d 957 (1972); Note, supra note 32, at 574.
49. E.g., Gion v. City of Santa Cruz, 2 Cal. 3d 29, 42-43, 465 P.2d 50, 58-59, 84 Cal. Rptr. 162,
170-71 (1970); Rainier Ave. Corp. v. City of Seattle, 80 Wash. 2d 362, 367-68, 494 P.2d 996, 999
(1972); see Note, supra note 32, at 579:
Neither the character of the public use nor the owner's intent serves to explain the shift in
judicial attitude toward creation of beach easements . . . . Growing recognition of both the
importance of public beach recreation and the substantial threat posed to public recreation by
private development has probably been the decisive factor in tilting [the] balance to favor the
public claim.
50. Gion v. City of Santa Cruz, 2 Cal. 3d 29, 42, 465 P.2d 50, 58, 84 Cal. Rptr. 162, 170 (1970).
The court in Gion did not base its public policy argument on any particular statute. Instead, it cited
provisions from many parts of the California code and constitution. Some of the provisions mentioned
by the court included presumptions of public ownership of land between high and low tide, constitu-
tional provisions in favor of allowing the public right-of-way to water, guarantees of the right to fish,
and prohibitions of structures on artificially accreted lands. Id. at 42-43, 465 P.2d at 58-59, 84 Cal.
Rptr. at 170-71. The manner in which the court gathered and interpreted these statutes is criticized in
Note, supra note 39, at 1106-09.
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further to take account of public cultural interests. The doctrine should be
applied to protect artwork acquired by museums. Such an application
would protect the public interest in important artwork by allowing the
public to bring suit to prevent destruction or mutilation of the work.
A. Artwork and Public Dedication Doctrine
The extension of public dedication doctrine to certain important works
of art would continue trends in both public dedication and real property
law. It is consistent with the historical public policy basis of public dedica-
tion law to apply the doctrine to artwork. As with beachfront property,
there is a policy recognized by state and federal statutes that favors the
development of public trust and dedication principles in the area. All fifty
states have state arts agencies that are charged with promoting and sup-
porting the arts."1 The California statutes state the policy directly: "The
Legislature hereby finds and declares . . .[that there is] a public interest
in preserving the integrity of cultural and artistic creations."5 Federal
support for the arts is evidenced in many ways, 3 most notably by the
NEA, which in 1979 received $139,660,000 to distribute to support the
development of the arts in the United States. 4
Although the concept of dedication has not been used previously to as-
sert public rights in personal, as opposed to real property,5 American
51. Goerkjian, States Arts Agencies: An Overview, in L. KREISBERG, LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND
THE ARTS 180 (1979). One state law expresses the policy in the following manner:
The Legislature perceives that life in California is enriched by art. The source of art is in the
natural flow of the human mind. Realizing craft and beauty is demanding, however, the peo-
ple of the state desire to encourage and nourish these skills wherever they occur, to the benefit
of all.
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 8750 (West 1980). The statutes of most other states express a similar public
policy. See, e.g. MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 397 (1978). Total annual state appropriations for the arts
amount to more than $80 million. 1979 NAT'L ENDOWMENT FOR THE ARTS ANN. REP. 3 (statement
of chairman L. Biddle) [hereinafter cited as 1979 NEA ANN. REP.]. In addition, there are six regional
arts councils that support and coordinate programs among the states. Goerkjian, supra, at 181.
52. The California Art Preservation Act, CAL. CIV. CODE § 987(a) (West Supp. 1981).
53. For a discussion of federal support and policies that further cultural development through the
visual arts, see pp. 140-41 infra. See also L. KREISBERG, LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND THE ARTS 169-79
(1979) (describing variety of arts programs run by federal agencies).
In general, important federal provisions concerning the arts are found in Chapter 26, Title 20 of
the United States Code, Support and Scholarship in Humanities and Arts; Museum Services (1976 &
Supp. III 1979). For an expression of federal policy recognizing the importance of protecting artistic
national heritage, see the Museum Services Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 961-968 (1976 & Supp. III 1979): "It
is the purpose of this subchapter to . . .assist museums in modernizing their methods and facilities so
that they may be better able to conserve our cultural, historic, and scientific heritage." Id. at § 961
(1976).
54. 1979 NEA ANN. REP., supra note 51, at 314.
55. In City of Chattanooga v. Louisville & N.R.R., 298 F. Supp. 1 (E.D. Tenn. 1969), afI'd, 427
F.2d 1154 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 903 (1970), a railroad company attempted to remove a
historic Civil War locomotive (the "General") from display in Chattanooga to place it on exhibit in
Georgia. The city of Chattanooga sued to require that the General be maintained in Chattanooga in
perpetuity as a historical monument. One of the plaintiffs' contentions was that the engine had been
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courts and legislatures are not constrained to obey historically based dis-
tinctions between real and personal property when such distinctions are
not useful or relevant.5' Real property doctrines may be applied to person-
alty in order to further public policy as long as disorder or injustice does
not result.5 7 Applying the law of public dedication to certain types of per-
sonal property would not result in disorder or injustice 8 and would be in
accord with the modern trend to diminish the impact of arbitrary legal
distinctions between real and personal property. 9
B. The Operation of the Doctrine of Public Dedication of Artwork
All of the elements that must be established to prove a case of public
dedication of land are also present in the context of museum acquisition of
artwork. A public right, and an owner's corresponding duty, to protect the
visual integrity of artwork could be created through the same offer and
acceptance mechanisms that operate in the context of real property
dedication.
publicly dedicated solely to the people of Chattanooga, and therefore could not be moved from the city.
In response, the court said that "dedication" was not an accurate term to use in reference to personal
property. 298 F. Supp. at 9. The court of appeals noted that the General was not threatened with
destruction-that the case involved only a dispute between groups as to the more appropriate means
of doing honor to the General. 427 F.2d at 1156. It affirmed the district court's judgment but com-
mented that:
We applaud and admire the zeal, the creativeness and the tirelessness with which [plaintiffs]
have continued to press on with their claims. Surely they will go the last mile and knock at the
portals of the Supreme Court. Innovators have not always been turned away merely because
they come without precedential support.
427 F.2d at 1155.
56. Many of the traditional distinctions that in the past were drawn between real and personal
property have solely historical justifications and thus are no longer adhered to. See note 57 infra. In
large part, the common law distinction between real and personal property is due "to the circumstance
that feudalism . . . was largely based on landholding . . . . [M]uch of the structure of medieval
English legal, political, and economic society was based on the institution of landholding." R. BROWN,
THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY 9-10 (Raushenbush 3d ed. 1975). Of course, there are inherent
differences between real and personal property that should be, and are, important and given weight in
formulating law.
57. For example, "the same estates that exist in land can now be created in chattels." 0. BROW-
DER, R. CUNNINGHAM, & J. JULIN, BASIC PROPERTY LAW 9 (1966). Modern statutes also provide for
uniformity in intestate succession to real and personal property, and in this regard, "[tihe clear mod-
ern tendency is to abolish any differentiation between . . . [real and personal property] as having at
the present time solely a historical justification." E. CLARK, L. LUSKY, & A. MURPHY, GRATUITOUS
TRANSFERS 72 (2d ed. 1977). There are also signs that the law of bailment and landlord-tenant law
are merging into a common doctrine. 0. BROWDER, R. CUNNINGHAM, & J. JULIN, supra, at 9. See J.
CRIBBET, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 10 (2d ed. 1975) ("Artificial distinctions [between
real and personal property] which obfuscate the law and complicate its practice should be abolished
but the real difference should never be lost to sight.")
58. See pp. 136-40 infra.
59. J. CRIBBET, supra note 57, at 10 (gradually diminishing differences in impact of law of real
and of personal property); see also 0. BROWDER, R. CUNNINGHAM, & J. JULIN, supra note 57, at 9
(development in law of "coalescence of the two branches of property law, which in fact amounts to
extension of real property concepts to personal property").
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1. Common-Law Dedication Through Museum Acquisition
Art museums collect and display artwork for purposes of scholarship
and cultural education." When an owner of artwork donates, sells, or
loans a work of art to a museum, he impliedly offers his property to the
public for educational uses. In the terminology of public dedication law,
he is "throwing open" his property to the public for its evident public use,
and thus an inference arises that he intends to dedicate the property for
those cultural and educational purposes.6 Since museums may be consid-
ered representatives of the public for cultural purposes,6 2 once a museum
accepts the offer to dedicate, that is, once it agrees to acquire the work, the
public interest in that work should be established."3 As with real property
dedication, a public trust would thereafter run with the work, perma-
nently prohibiting the owner from treating it in a manner inconsistent
with the public interest.64
60. See 20 U.S.C. § 968(4) (1976) ("'[m]useum' means a public or private nonprofit agency or
institution organized on a permanent basis for essentially educational or esthetic purposes, which,
utilizing a professional staff, owns or utilizes tangible objects, cares for them, and exhibits them to the
public on a regular basis."); 1979 NEA ANN. REP., supra note 51, at 141 (museums "symbolize
disinterested excellence; they are places where scholarship can be conducted for its own sake, where
quality matters more than anything else"); PROFESSIONAL PRACTICES COMMITTEE, ASSOCIATION OF
ART MUSEUM DIRECTORS, PROFESSIONAL PRACTICES IN ART MUSEUMS (1971), reprinted in 2 J.
MERRYMAN & A. ELSEN, LAW, ETHICS AND THE VISUAL ARTS 7-45, 7-45 (1979) (Resolution #1)
("A museum is defined as a permanent, non-profit institution, essentially educational or aesthetic in
purpose, with professional staff, which acquires objects, cares for them, interprets them, and exhibits
them to the public on some regular schedule.") [hereinafter cited as PROFESSIONAL PRACTICES IN ART
MUSEUMS]; id. at 7-51 (Resolution #41) ("The program of an art museum must necessarily be re-
lated to the museum's purposes and goals. The program should recognize the nature of the institu-
tion's various audiences and their expectations. Broadly speaking, the program is developed to inter-
pret the collections and to amplify their significance for the public."); Cerra, Museum's Future Tied
to Politics of its Past, N.Y. Times., Nov. 23, 1980, § 11 (Long Island Weekly), at I (quoting L.
Reger, Director of American Association of Museums) (museums should use their collections to pro-
duce a catalog that "'discussles] how the collection relates to society. Objects. . . are only a way of us
[sic] appreciating cultural or natural history.' ")
Since 1870, no museum has been founded in the United States "without formally recognizing its
obligation toward public education." G. HAMILTON, Education and Scholarship in the American Mu-
seum, in ON UNDERSTANDING ART MUSEUMS (1975), reprinted in 2 J. MERRYMAN & A. ELSEN,
LAW, ETHICS, AND THE VISUAL ARTS 7-2, 7-3 (1979). The Museum Services Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 961-
968 (1976 & Supp. III 1979), specifically recognizes that museums serve an essentially educational
function. One of the Act's primary purposes is "to encourage and assist museums in their educational
role, in conjunction with formal systems of elementary, secondary, and post-secondary education and
with programs of nonformal education for all age groups .. " Id. § 961 (1976).
61. See p. 127 supra; cf. Village of Villa Park v. Wanderer's Rest Cemetery Co., 316 Ill. 226,
228, 147 N.E. 104, 105 (1925) (deed conveying cemetery is dedication of it as cemetery).
62. Museums are taxpayer-supported institutions, see 1979 NEA ANN. REP., supra note 51, at 3,
314 (partial summary of state and federal funding of museums).
63. All such dedicated artwork will have educational value. Professional museum practices require
that acquisitions be made for purposes of education and conservation, and that objects not be acquired
solely for their commercial value. International Council of Museums, Recommendations on Standards
of Museum Acquisitions, reprinted in L. DUBOFF, ART LAW, DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL 559,
561 (1975) (Resolution #12).
64. See pp. 127-28 supra (describing public trust principle and irrevocability of dedication).
Even now, museums generally recognize, in some vaguely defined way, that they hold artwork in
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This dedication is neither limited nor conditional. A transfer to a mu-
seum constitutes an offer to dedicate the work to the public for its educa-
tional purposes regardless of the form-donation, sale, or loan-that the
transfer takes. Even a loan arrangement represents recognition by the of-
feree and the offeror of the permanent educational characteristics of the
work." The existence of that implied mutual understanding constitutes an
irrevocable dedication of the work to the public for educational uses."'
Moreover, the dedication cannot be avoided by a reservation in the bill
of transfer disclaiming a public interest in the integrity of the artwork.
Traditionally, an owner may not annex limitations to his grant of user in
real property that defeat the purpose of the dedication.67 If he attempts to
do so, the dedication will be effective, but the restriction will be deemed
null and void."8 Since the purpose of public dedication of art is to educate
the public through exposure to the visual characteristics of the work, a
reservation that in effect allowed the dedicator or his successors to impair
those characteristics would be inconsistent with the purpose of the grant,
and thus void.
The imposition of a permanent public trust on artwork acquired by
museums would not deter owners of art from dedicating their work to the
trust for the public. See College Art Association, Resolution Concerning the Sale and Exchange of
Works of Art by Museums, reprinted in L. DUBOFF, ART LAW, DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL 409
(1975) (Resolution #12) ("Objects in tax-exempt institutions are held in trust for the public. In this
sense they are the cultural property of the public, both present and future."); Problems in the Acqui-
sition, Management, and Disposal of Museum Objects, in ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY ON LEGAL
PROBLEMS OF MUSEUM ADMINISTRATION 69 (Transcript 1973) (statement of S. Weil, Administrator
of Whitney Museum of American Art) ("[Y]ou have the assertion that works held in a museum are
held in public trust . . . . [T]here is no point being insensitive to the question; it's just there.")
[hereinafter cited as LEGAL PROBLEMS OF MUSEUM ADMINISTRATION].
65. Although public tastes in art change, one of the essential qualities of good artwork is its
timelessness and the educational and cultural contributions it makes to future generations. See H.R.
REP. NO. 618, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 5, reprinted in [1965] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3186,
3190 (quoting President Eisenhower's Commission on National Goals, 1960 report) ("In the eyes of
posterity, the success of the United States as a civilized society will be largely judged by the creative
activities of its citizens in art, architecture, literature, music, and the sciences.").
66. The dedication is not violative of the Fifth Amendment takings clause because it is based on
implied consent between the owner and the public. E.g., Haven Homes, Inc. v. Raritan Township, 19
N.J. 239, 247, 116 A.2d 25, 29 (1955).
67. See 4 H. TIFFANY, supra note 29, § 1111, at 631; see, e.g., Kirsch Holding Co. v. Borough of
Manasquan, 24 N.J. Super. 91, 104, 93 A.2d 582, 589 (1952) (attempted reservation in dedication of
beachfront to allow owner and his successors to maintain bathing grounds, ropes, and boats on beach-
front held invalid because it was inconsistent with purposes of public recreation); City of Fort Worth
v. Ryan Properties, 284 S.W.2d 211 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955) (reservation by dedicator of right to
maintain ornamental stone columns on dedicated property held void because it obstructed use for
street purposes).
68. See Village of Grosse Pointe Shores v. Ayres, 254 Mich. 58, 65, 235 N.W. 829, 832 (1931)
(condition in street dedication that prohibited use of street for public utility purposes was void but
dedication was still valid; when condition in dedication "is void as against public policy or as inconsis-
tent with the grant, the dedication is effective but the condition is inoperative"); Kuehn v. Village of
Mahtomedi, 207 Minn. 518, 524, 292 N.W. 187, 190 (1940) (quoting 18 C.J. Dedication § 64, at
71 (1919)) (dedicator cannot impose conditions or limitations inconsistent with legal character of dedi-
cation); note 67 supra.
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public. Those who sell or donate works of art to museums are not con-
cerned with the conditions that will be placed upon future owners."' Own-
ers will not be discouraged from loaning their artwork either. When art-
work is put on loan, its sale price and donation value increase.70 The
appreciation in value that results from the loan arrangement produces a
strong positive inducement to loan that would not be outweighed by the
imposition of a reasonable public trust responsibility upon the work.
Moreover, the appreciation is in itself adequate compensation to the
owner for the costs of future maintenance."
Museum acquisition is an ideal occasion to recognize a public interest
in artwork. First, the requirement of museum acceptance appropriately
limits the doctrine of public dedication of art. A public trust should not be
imposed without some guarantee that a work is of some importance to the
public. Museum acquisition ensures that the public interest will attach
only to a limited amount of art of recognized quality.72 Second, museum
acquisition provides certain evidence that the public has in fact accepted
an owner's implied offer to dedicate a work of art.
2. The Responsibilities of the Owner of Publicly Dedicated Artwork
As a fiduciary of the public, the owner of dedicated artwork would be
entrusted with a duty to prevent it from being destroyed or defaced, either
negligently or willfully. Museum acquistion of a work of art is premised
on the quality of its visual characteristics.74 When those characteristics are
69. The sales price of the work will not be adversely affected. Future owners will be largely
indifferent to the imposition of the trust because they generally intend to treat the work with care
whether or not the trust is imposed.
70. Rosenbaum, The Care and Feeding of Donors, ARTNEWS, Nov. 1978, at 98, 100 (quoting G.
Glueck, art critic for New York Times) (periodic exhibition and catalog of private art collection
loaned to museum "will boost its sales or donation value elsewhere" and in return, museum hopes to
get donation of some pieces); see Kinkead, The Spectacular Fall and Rise of Hans Hoffman,
ARTNEWS, Summer 1980, at 88, 95 (exhibition caused value of artwork to "leap dramatically").
71. In fact, the incremental cost of maintenance after the work is dedicated will usually be zero
because in most instances, due care was being exercised before dedication. In such a case, the owner
will be indifferent to the imposition of the public trust upon his work.
72. To be considered a "museum," an organization is expected to maintain professional standards
in the acquisition and exhibition of artwork. See note 63 supra (museums must acquire objects for
educational and not commercial value); see also 20 U.S.C. § 968 (1976) (definition of "museum"
includes a requirement that the organization utilize a "professional staff"); PROFESSIONAL PRACTICES
IN ART MUSEUMS, supra note 60, at 7-45 (same). If it does not maintain those professional standards,
the museum faces loss of accreditation from the American Association of Museums. See Cerra, supra
note 60, at 1 (museum losing its accreditation because it did not meet "professional quality" standard
in educating and exhibiting objects to public). Loss of accreditation can impair museum fundraising
activities and endanger its receipt of state appropriations.
73. If the existence of a public offer and acceptance could be proved in other circumstances-for
example, in the case of outdoor urban sculpture-then works in those cases should also be considered
publicly dedicated. The problem, however, is that the requirement of public acceptance would not be
convincingly satisfied merely by proof that the public viewed a work of art in passing.
74. See notes 63 & 72 supra.
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altered, the cultural and educational benefits provided by the work are
impaired. Therefore, to fulfill his fiduciary duty, the owner would be re-
quired to preserve the work's visual integrity as it existed at the time it
was dedicated.
5
This duty to preserve dedicated artwork would continue even if the art-
work were temporarily removed from display or deaccessioned from the
museum's collection. 76 Artwork that has been removed from public display
often returns to it through repurchase, donation, or loan." The public
trust in it remains effective in the interim so that the work can continue to
contribute to the culture and serve its educational purpose in future
years.7"
For the owner to fulfill his fiduciary duty, he would have to perform
75. This assumes that the work of art was not damaged or in need of restoration at the time of
acquisition. If the work is in need of restoration when it is acquired by the museum, then the implicit
terms of museum acceptance incorporate an anticipated restoration. In that case, the dedication pro-
hibits further damage to the work, and, if the work is restored, requires that the integrity of its visual
characteristics be maintained in such restored condition.
76. Property dedicated for public purposes need not be available to the public continuously; the
public's use of the property may be regulated for the public benefit. See, e.g., Town of Chouteau v.
Blankenship, 152 P.2d 379, 384 (Okla. 1944) (town did not need to open street dedicated to public,
but was not estopped from opening it later); Hyland v. City of Eugene, 179 Or. 567, 173 P.2d 464
(1946) (temporary mobile home community for veterans could be built on property dedicated for park
purposes because interference with park purposes was not permanent).
Rotation and substitution of artwork on display enhances public education by exposing the public
to different works of art. Similarly, deaccessioning work from a museum's collection enhances the
museum's services to the community by providing money to purchase, and space to display, new
works. In addition, deaccessioning lowers museum inventory and upkeep costs.
77. Custody of museum-quality works of art often changes hands, from museums to private indi-
viduals and back again. Museums acquire a large part of the work displayed in their exhibitions and
contained in their collections through loans and donations, and at least some of it is likely to have been
exhibited previously. For an interesting example of the return of an important painting to public view
after deaccessioning, see LEGAL PROBLEMS OF MUSEUM ADMINISTRATION, supra note 64, at 69:
There was great distress many years ago when the Whitney Museum was forced by economic
circumstances to sell its collection of 19th century American paintings. There was a feeling
that those works had been taken away from the public. The most important painting in that
group was a painting by Thomas Eakins. . ., which is now in the National Gallery in Wash-
ington. Clearly, there is a question as to whether that painting was taken away from the
public at all or whether its disposition by the Whitney did not bring it to a larger public.
78. There is a difference between the character of the public interest in restoration of dedicated
land and in restoration of dedicated artwork. In cases involving public dedication of land, the state or
the public can direct that the public be given access to the property. In the case of artwork that
remains in the control of a private owner, however, the interest in its integrity is not based on a right
to demand immediate access. Instead, the interest is based on the idea that over time, the ownership of
important artwork often changes hands, from public to private owner, and back again, leading to a
longer-range public benefit:
The old adage that 'Art is long, and life is short' is still apt. For scientists and scholars even a
minor work from the past encapsulates religious, political, social, economic, and technological
systems. Preserving the art of the past is essential to knowledge and wisdom. . .. [An] artistic
heritage is a country's identity card for the present and passport to the future. Art tells us who
we are and where we came from.
Elsen, Why Do We Care About Art? 27 HASTINGS L.J. 951, 952 (1976). See also pp. 140-41 infra
(describing legislative recognition of contribution good artwork makes to culture and advancement of
future generations).
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reasonable maintenance procedures and refrain from abusing the visual
attributes of the work. This standard of care would prevent an owner
from negligently permitting valuable work to deteriorate, as well as from
purposely destroying or mutilating it." The standard would be one of
good faith and reasonable effort, not one of strict liability.8" Under this
standard, for example, the owner of dedicated work would be permitted to
restore a previously damaged painting.
C. Mechanisms to Enforce Public Rights in Artwork
In order to be effective, rights obtained by the public through principles
of public dedication must be enforceable. Enforceability would require the
existence of adequate notice, standing to sue in an appropriate court, and
the availability of appropriate remedies.
1. Notice
As a prerequisite to enforcement of the public's interest in the integrity
of artwork, the owner of the work must have adequate notice that his
property is subject to a public trust.8" Although some owners of dedicated
artwork-such as the museum that acquires the work, the owner of a
work on loan, or the first purchaser of a deaccessioned work of
art-would have actual notice of the public use and therefore of the public
interest in the artwork, subsequent owners might not have such notice.
To provide this notice, state arts councils, 2 or the National Endowment
79. For example, the standard would prevent the negligent deterioration of the Rodin collection at
the Maryhill Museum, described in Failing, supra note 1, at 83. It would also prevent the purposeful
stripping of paint from sculptor David Smith's work described in Kramer, Altering of Smith Work
Stirs Dispute, N.Y. Times, Sept. 13, 1974, at 28, col. 1, and the immobilization of one of Alexander
Calder's mobiles described in Mobilizing for Pittsburgh, supra note 1.
80. Cf H. HENN, CORPORATIONS § 236, at 457-59 (2d ed. 1970) (corporate directors' and of-
ficers' fiduciary duties require good faith and fair dealing); see generally W. CARY & M. EISENBERG,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 518-37 (5th ed. 1980) (same).
81. Under traditional due process analysis, a property owner is entitled to notice before his prop-
erty is attached or impaired by the state. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339
U.S. 306 (1950) (notice must be given to beneficiaries of trust in proceeding that settles their rights to
sue trustee); L. TRIBE, supra note 19, at 509.
With real property, dedication is viewed as a covenant running with the land, see note 40 supra,
and is applied against successors to the original dedicator's interest. This does not seem too harsh
because public claims on land may be evidenced openly by public user, or successor owners may have
access to plats that indicate the public interest in the property. But f. Town of Chouteau v. Blanken-
ship, 152 P.2d 379, 384 (Okla. 1944) (although at least 30 years had gone by without evidence of
public user, and abutting owners had fenced in property and made improvements on it, town that did
not affirmatively mislead parties was not estopped from opening street whenever it chose because "the
person who encroaches upon a public way must know, as a matter of law, that the way belongs to the
public") (emphasis added).
Public dedication of personal property such as art presents more difficult problems of notice because
the claims probably will never be evident on the face of the property. A mechanism is needed, there-
fore, to provide successor owners with notice that a public interest in the work of art exists.
82. All fifty states have state arts councils. Goerkjian, supra note 51, at 180. There are also six
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for the Arts, 3 could maintain a master list of protected art. Several state,
regional, and federal art information systems already exist that could be
adapted to meet this end.84 The master list would be a compilation of all
works subject to public dedication, based on information supplied by mu-
seums about their collections."5 The list would become a public record to
which buyers of art could refer, thus providing notice to uninformed pur-
chasers of the public interest attached to their art."'
2. Standing
If artwork on the master list were threatened with injury, or if damage
to it were discovered, both individual members of the public and govern-
ment respresentatives of the public would have standing to bring suit
against the owner for failing to live up to the standard of care imposed on
him. Government representatives, such as local governments and state
attorneys general, traditionally have been given standing in public dedica-
tion cases in order to protect their constituents.88 In addition, individual
regional arts councils. Id. at 181.
83. The National Endowment for the Arts is the primary agency responsible for federal support
of the arts. See generally pp. 141-42 infra.
84. To provide notice of public dedication of art, an archive of either computer or microfilmed
descriptions of artwork open to the public would be necessary. Coordinated, computerized art infor-
mation networks that could be helpful in instituting such an archive have already been developed for
fifty-six state arts agencies and regional organizations. 1979 NEA ANN. REP., supra note 51, at 310-
12. In 1979 alone, the NEA spent at least $369,465 to develop and improve these systems. Id. In
addition, there currently exist two major federal programs that collect information about works of
visual art that could be adapted for use in maintaining a master list of dedicated art. The "Archives of
American Art" lhas assembled the world's largest collection of material documenting the history of the
visual arts in the United States. The original collection is kept in Washington and microfilm copies
are kept in six regional branches. Copies of the original collection are accessible through interlibrary
loans. The National Collection of Fine Arts, connected to the Smithsonian Institution, also maintains
a large archive of information concerning American art. Its "Bicentennial Inventory of American
Paintings Executed Before 1914" contains computerized descriptions of over 150,000 paintings.
85. Museums already document their collections and exhibitions as a matter of sound professional
practice. See, e.g., Smithsonian Institution Policy on Museum Acquisitions, reprinted in L. DUBOFF,
ART LAW, DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL 593 (1975). Thus, organizing a master list of dedicated
art would only require museums to transmit their documentation to the organization responsible for
maintaining it.
86. The list might also be adaptable to other uses. For example, the information could be helpful
in instituting a list, similar to that kept by France, Japan, and Hungary, of significant art located
within the country, in order to control the movement of cultural property. See Feldman & Burnham,
An Art Archive: Principles and Realization, 10 CONN. L. REV. 702, 723-25 (1978).
87. The owner of dedicated artwork would himself, of course, be able to bring a private suit
against anyone who damaged the work. However, because he holds the work in trust for the public,
see note 41 supra (owner of dedicated property is public trustee), any money recovered would have to
be held in trust for the purpose of restoring the work, cf. pp. 139-40 infra (damages for destruction of
dedicated property must be held in trust for public for purposes of dedication).
88. See, e.g., County of Los Angeles v. Berk, 26 Cal. 3d 201, 224, 605 P.2d 381, 396, 161 Cal.
Rptr. 742, 757 (1980) (county and city had standing to assert public recreational interests in beach-
front property as trustees for public although they had no other rights in it). In the case of publicly
dedicated artwork, the appropriate public representatives would be the attorney general or the arts
council of the state in which the dedication occurred. See also Note, supra note 39, at 1096; Note,
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members of the public historically have had standing to sue to protect the
public interest in dedicated property on the ground that they ordinarily
would be entitled to the benefits of the property being threatened or de-
stroyed, 9 or on the ground that they have a justiciable interest in cases
that involve dedicated property maintained with government funds." In a
dispute arising over the mutilation of dedicated artwork, therefore, mem-
bers of the public would be able to sue in their individual capacity as
beneficiaries of the public trust. They would also have standing to sue as
taxpayers, because government funds are spent to support museums and
to finance acquisition and maintenance of artwork."
3. Jurisdiction
The suit would be brought in a state court, which would exercise juris-
diction over the case in accordance with the minimum contacts theory of
state court jurisdiction.92 The minimum contacts doctrine would be satis-
fied if the work of art was located within the state. 3 It would also be
supra note 32, at 572.
89. E.g., Dietz v. King, 2 Cal. 3d 29, 465 P.2d 50, 84 Cal. Rptr. 162 (1970) (suit concerning
dedicated beachfront brought by plaintiffs on behalf of the public); Trustees of the Philadelphia Mu-
seums v. Trustees of the Univ. of Pa., 251 Pa. 115, 122-23, 96 A. 123, 125 (1915) (individuals have
standing to contest alienation by city of publicly dedicated land because they are members of public to
whom property was donated).
90. E.g., Gewirtz v. City of Long Beach, 69 Misc. 2d 763, 330 N.Y.S.2d 495, 502 (1972), afl'd,
45 A.D.2d 841, 358 N.Y.S.2d 957 (1974) (resident and nonresident state taxpayers have standing to
sue in suit concerning dedicated town beach); Trustees of the Philadelphia Museums v. Trustees of
the Univ. of Pa., 251 Pa. 115, 122-23, 96 A. 123, 125 (1915) (taxpayers have standing to contest
alienation by city of publicly dedicated land because their money has been used in improving it).
91. Museums are supported by state and federal tax dollars. All fifty states have arts agencies that
subsidize museums. In fiscal year 1979-1980, for example, the New York State Council on the Arts
awarded $5.6 million to 170 different institutions.
92. The minimum contacts doctrine imposes due process constraints upon the exercise of jurisdic-
tion by state courts. See generally World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 100 S. Ct. 559, 564-
66 (1980); F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 12.14, at 630-38 (2d ed. 1977); D. LOUI-
SELL & G. HAZARD, PLEADING AND PROCEDURE 194-289 (4th ed. 1979). Because public dedication is
a common-law doctrine, jurisdictional gaps and lack of uniformity among the states will inevitably
cause slippage in the protection of publicly dedicated artwork. This situation argues in favor of a
comprehensive federal solution to the problem. But see note 6 supra. Despite the slippage, courts
could gain jurisdiction over cases involving public dedication of art in the variety of situations de-
scribed in the text.
The development of the doctrine of public dedication of art in less than all the states would not
discourage ownership of or commercial transactions in art in states that did develop the doctrine, since
the incremental cost of maintaining artwork in compliance with the doctrine is a minimal one, see
note 71 supra, and is outweighed by positive personal and business reasons for ownership of an
investment in art. Cf. CAL. CIV. CODE § 986 (West Supp. 1981) (artists' five percent resale royalty
tax, which implicitly evidences willingness to impose even heavier burden on sales and ownership of
art in California). That resale royalty law was unsuccessfully challenged as an impermissible burden
on interstate commerce. Morseburg v. Balyon, 621 F.2d 972 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 399
(1980).
93. "A state has power to exercise judicial jurisdiction to affect interests in a thing if the relation-
ship of the thing to the state is such as to make the exercise of such jurisdiction reasonable." RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 56(1) (1971). It is reasonable, under the minimum contacts
The Public Interest in Art
satisfied if the owner of the dedicated artwork resided in the state or pur-
chased the artwork there.94 Jurisdiction could probably also be exercised
over an owner who maintained a relationship with an art gallery or mu-
seum located within the state,9" and, in rare cases, might even be exercised
over an owner whose only relationship with the state was that he owned
property such as a bank account there.96
4. Remedies
The owner, if held liable, would be responsible for restoring the art-
work to the condition it was in at the time the work was originally dedi-
cated,97 just as an owner who interferes with the condition of publicly
dedicated land must restore the land to its original state.98 If dedicated
standard, for a state to exercise jurisdiction over artwork that is in the state and that has been dedi-
cated to the people of that state. The dedication gives the state an interest in the property; the fact that
the owner keeps it in that state indicates that he maintains minimum contacts there.
94. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 986(a) (West Supp. 1981) ("[w]henever a work of fine art is sold
and the seller resides in California or the sale takes place in California," seller must pay artist five
percent of resale value as royalty).
95. The defendant would then be transacting an art business in the state and thus it would not be
unreasonable to subject him to a suit concerning a work of art that had been dedicated there. Cf.
Black v. Acme Markets, Inc., 564 F.2d 681, 685 (5th Cir. 1977) (jurisdiction in Texas may be exer-
cised over out-of-state corporation when alleged conspiratorial activity took place wholly out of state,
but corporation had made purchases of products from Texas and Texan interests were affected). In
general, the courts would be liberal in exercising jurisdiction over defendants in a suit to protect the
integrity of publicly dedicated artwork. The minimum contacts doctrine views the burden placed upon
the defendant by the exercise of jurisdiction in light of the forum state's interest in adjudicating the
dispute, the shared interest of the several states in furthering fundamental substantive social policies,
and the absence of any other forum in which the injury can be redressed. World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291-92 (1980). In a suit to protect dedicated artwork, the forum
state has an interest in protecting the property because it is dedicated to its citizens, there is a shared
interest among the states in a social policy favoring the arts, see p. 130 supra, and there may be no
other forum available in which to redress the injury.
96. This type of jurisdiction might be exercised if there was no other forum available in which to
protect the artwork. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980) (lack
of other forum to redress injury is factor in deciding whether minimum contacts doctrine is satisfied);
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 211 n.37 (1977) (leaving undecided whether minimum contacts
doctrine applies if no other forum available to plaintiff).
97. The suit usually would be instituted only after the threat or injury to the artwork was discov-
ered, and would be directed toward compelling the owner to restore the work to its original condition.
It would also be possible, however, to bring suit against the owner to compel him to account for the
good condition of the artwork. As with monetary trusts, artwork in the hands of a private owner is
invisible to the beneficiary, and therefore any party interested in the administration of the trust, even
if he "has only a future interest and that. . . interest is contingent," A. SCOTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS
§ 172, at 1401 (3d ed. 1967), should be able to bring suit against the trustee to compel an accounting
to ensure that the trust is being properly administered. See G. G. BOGERT & G. T. BOGERT, HAND-
BOOK OF THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 142, at 501 (5th ed. 1973) (it is elementary principle that fiduciaries
can be required to account for their dealings with trust property). Of course, the request for an
accounting must be a reasonable one. See A. SCOTT, supra, § 172, at 1400. A request for an account-
ing of the condition of dedicated art should be denied as unreasonable if suits were instituted too
frequently and without just cause, or if the work was on exhibition and thus its condition was already
ascertainable. If suits became duplicative, res judicata or collateral estoppel defenses might also be
raised.
98. See Herron v. Boggs, 582 S.W.2d 643, 644 (Ky. 1979) (defendant must remove his residence
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artwork were destroyed irreparably, the defendant would be responsible
for damages measured by the value of the destroyed work. The damages
recovered for irreparable destruction would be allocated to future museum
programs." This type of a distribution is consistent with the rule applied
by courts when restoration of dedicated real property is not possible: the
defendant compensates the public, and the damages are applied toward
the same purposes as the original public dedication."' In addition, in the
rare cases in which the destruction was malicious or due to gross negli-
gence, punitive damages also could be assessed and awarded for use in
museum activities.101
III. A Statutory Basis for Asserting a Public Right in the Visual Integ-
rity of Artwork
The class of artwork threatened with injury by careless, tasteless, or
selfish owners extends beyond work acquired by museums. A statutory
approach already exists that can protect some of this larger class of art-
work. Artwork produced under government subsidy should be protected
from mutilation and destruction by the promulgation of regulations under
existing statutes and executive orders.
A. The Federal Policy of Support for the Arts
Many sections of the federal statutory framework express a concern for
protecting a public interest in art. The Historic Sites, Buildings and Anti-
from land previously dedicated as public park and must restore property to its original condition).
99. Cf. The California Art Preservation Act, CAL. CIV. CODE § 987(e)(3) (West Supp. 1981)
("In the event that punitive damages are awarded [for the mutilation, alteration, or destruction of art],
the court shall, in its discretion, select an organization or organizations engaged in charitable or edu-
cational activities involving the fine arts in California to receive such damages.")
100. See State v. Cooper, 24 N.J. 261, 276, 131 A.2d 756, 764 (1957) (applying the doctrine of cy
pres to public dedication law, and finding that state must compensate municipality for taking of pub-
licly dedicated park land with funds received to be directed to park purposes). The goal of furthering
the general charitable intent of the donor through the doctrine of cy pres, when his specific intent
cannot be fulfilled, derives from the kinship between public dedication law and the laws surrounding
charitable trusts, see id. at 276, 131 A.2d at 764 (no good reason exists to refuse to apply cy pres to
cases involving public dedication); pp. 127-28 supra; cf. 6A R. POWELL, supra note 30, 92613], at
84-105 (liberal use of cy pres to expand original dedication).
Monetary compensation is never a satisfactory substitute for the loss of a unique, irreplaceable
work of art. Such compensation could, however, be used to further the purposes of educating the
public through art-for example, through purchasing other artwork-and thereby to promote the
general purposes of the original dedication. Cf. ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY ON LEGAL PROBLEMS OF
MUSEUM ADMINISTRATION (1975), reprinted in H. MERRYMAN & A. ELSEN, LAW, ETHICS, AND THE
VISUAL ARTS 7-171 (1979) (statement of Mr. Marsh, participant in conference) ("[W]e can say that
art is irreplaceable, but after all is said and done . . . there are such things as disasters, and when the
'irreplaceable' works are gone, the hope of some kind of compensation. . . is very, very comforting.")
101. The California Art Preservation Act, CAL. CIV. CODE § 987(e)(3) (West Supp. 1981), for
example, allows the court to assess punitive damages against a person who willfully mutilates or
destroys a work of visual art.
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quities Act'012 declares that it is "a national policy to preserve for public
use .. .objects of national significance." ' 3 Presidential Executive Or-
der 11,593, entitled Protection and Enhancement of the Cultural Envi-
ronment, 04 also instructs federal agencies of the need to respect the exis-
tence of a public interest in objects of cultural importance. It directs all
federal agencies to administer the cultural properties under their control
"in a spirit of . . . trusteeship for future generations," and to institute
procedures to ensure that their programs contribute to the preservation
and enhancement of nonfederally owned objects of historical signifi-
cance.105 The NEA, however, is the primary vehicle for federal support of
the arts. That agency was established specifically to encourage the devel-
opment of the arts in the United States and to expand public exposure to
and appreciation of the arts.106 A major objective of the NEA is to ensure
production, in tangible form, of creative arts projects that will exhibit and
advance knowledge for present and future generations. 07
B. The NEA's Role in Implementing the Federal Policy of Support for
the Arts
Consistent with the congressional policy of support for the production
and preservation of art, the NEA awards fellowship grants to artists and
arts organizations.00 The NEA recognizes that the public has an interest
in the results produced under its grants and thus it retains a nonexclusive,
102. 16 U.S.C. §§ 461-467 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
103. 16 U.S.C. § 461 (1976). Certain classes of artwork could be categorized as "objects of na-
tional significanie." Although Congress did not consider explicitly the status of works of art within
that term, the goals of the historic preservation laws arguably are defined broadly enough to encom-
pass works of art. For example, in describing the National Historic Preservation Act, 16 U.S.C.A. §§
470 to 470a, 470b, 470c to 470w-6 (West Special Pamphlet 1980), the House Report explains that:
"First and foremost . . . the goal of historic preservation is to provide the citizens of our nation with
an understanding and appreciation of their cultural origins and heritage. It is to foster a long-range
perspective of. . .[among other things] our. . . arts." H.R. REP. No. 1457, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 21,
reprinted in [1980] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6378, 6384. Thus, the policy of the Act is to
preserve not only historic and architectural objects, but more generally, to preserve America's "vital
legacy of cultural, educational, aesthetic [and] inspirational . . . benefits . . . for future generations
." 16 U.S.C.A. § 470(a)(4) (West Special Pamphlet 1980).
104. 3 C.F.R. 154 (1971), reprinted in 16 U.S.C. § 470 app., at 429 (1976).
105. Id. at 155, 16 U.S.C. § 470 app., at 429 (1976).
106. See 20 U.S.C. § 954(c) (1976 & Supp. III 1979); see generally H. R. REP. No. 618, 89th
Cong., 1st Sess. 4-6, reprinted in [1965] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3186, 3190-91.
107. See H. R. REP. NO. 618, supra note 106, at 5, [1965] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at
3190.
108. In 1979, total appropriations for visual arts grants amounted to $5,815,808. 1979 NEA
ANN. REP., supra note 51, at 314. Recipients of awards are expected to furnish the NEA with photo-
graphs of the work produced in the course of their grant. NEA Fellowship Acceptance Agreement (on
file with Yale Law Journal). Other NEA programs, for example, "Art in Public Places," which
enables nonprofit groups and municipalities to acquire art for exhibition in public places, and which
was given $733,022 in 1979, 1979 NEA ANN. REP., supra note 51, at 244, and "Museum Programs,"
which was awarded $25,789,496 in grants in fiscal 1979, id. at 141, also function to contribute to the
knowledge of present and future generations through the production or conservation of works of art.
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royalty-free license to use the reproduceable results of the activities it sup-
ports.' °' In addition to obtaining this license, however, the NEA should
secure more fully the public interest in Endowment-supported works of
art by asserting a qualified proprietary interest in them.1'1
The award of an NEA grant represents the recognition of artistic excel-
lence.'11 Artwork that has been altered or damaged does not properly rep-
resent that excellence and misrepresents to the public the educational and
cultural value of the NEA investment. '1 2 In order for the public to receive
the full value of the NEA expenditures, therefore, the NEA should pro-
tect the visual integrity of the work that it finances.
Because NEA-supported projects can usually be possessed by only one
individual at a time, the NEA cannot, like other agencies, secure the pub-
lic interest by guaranteeing the public access to the work it funds."' In-
stead, in order to carry out legislative mandate and executive policy, the
NEA should afford contractual protection to the integrity of work pro-
duced under its grant. It should assert, as a condition of the terms of a
grant, a qualified proprietary interest in the work produced under it. Such
an assertion of government co-ownership, limited to the extent of an inter-
est in the integrity of the final product, would allow the government to
protect the cultural and educational purposes for which the project was
supported." 4
C. Enforcing the NEA's Interest
As in the case of artwork subject to public dedication, in order for the
109. 1976 NEA Draft Resolution (statement on copyright policy) (adopted as final) (on file with
Yale Law Journal). This license is rarely used.
110. Although for the sake of simplicity this Note discusses the NEA's role in protecting the
integrity of the artwork that it finances in terms of grants to individual artists, the principles described
in this Note apply broadly-to all NEA grant programs that are used to finance the production,
acquisition, or conservation of artwork.
111. See S. REP. No. 100, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 6, reprinted in [1973] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2289, 2294 (award of NEA grants to individuals should be supplemented by "some type of
recognition ceremony or appropriate written document" to honor grantees because they "have been
selected for national recognition of achievement").
112. For an example of mutilated, federally supported artwork, see Gross, Mural Restored, but
the Hurt Remains, Newsday, Sept. 19, 1980, at 17 (describing incomplete restoration of mural
financed by Works Progress Administration in 1930's that was painted over during McCarthy era
because its design supposedly incorporated hammer and sickle).
113. The National Science Foundation, for example, is able to implement the public interest in
the inventions that it funds by requiring its inventors to disclose accurate information about their
Foundation-supported activities for other public purposes. 41 C.F.R. 142, § 25-9.106(a) (1980). Al-
though the NEA does retain a non-exclusive license to reproduce publishable results of Endowment-
supported activities in furtherance of Endowment purposes, see note 109 supra, the dissemination of
reproductions of works of visual art cannot satisfactorily take the place of public exposure to the
original.
114. The United States has the same right as a private owner to sue to protect its property from
injury. Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148, 151 (1955).
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NEA to enforce the public interest in the work it funds, adequate notice
of the interest must be given to owners, and the appropriate party must
bring suit to remedy the injury. Notice to owners of the federal govern-
ment's proprietary interest in their work could be accomplished,1 " by com-
piling a list of artwork produced under NEA grants." 6 The NEA, as the
agency asserting the federal proprietary interest, would then sue any per-
son who interfered with the integrity of the work.' 7 It would request in-
junctive relief to force the owner to restore the work to its original condi-
tion, or, if restoration were impossible, it would seek damages to be used
for related NEA purposes."'
Conclusion
The public interest in protecting and preserving important works of art
has not been adequately safeguarded in the past, even though a legal basis
for such protection exists. Courts should adopt a common-law doctrine of
public dedication of art that allows government representatives and pri-
vate individuals to bring suit to protect the visual integrity of culturally
valuable works of art from both intentional and negligent injury. In addi-
tion, the National Endowment for the Arts should further protect the
public interest in art by promulgating regulations that allow that agency
to sue to protect publicly supported artwork from injury. These two legal
solutions would provide the public with the tools necessary to better pro-
tect its cultural heritage.
115. The National Science Foundation, for example, solves the problem of providing notice of the
government's proprietary interest in inventions it finances by requiring that patents and patent appli-
cations be stamped with a legend that indicates the government's interest. 41 C.F.R. 141-42, § 25-
9.105(e) (1980). Although such a legend could be applied to the back of certain works of art, in other
cases it would not be possible to mark the work without marring its features. A different notice system
is therefore necessary.
116. The information necessary to compile an effective list is already available. The NEA grant
procedures already require grantees to provide information, descriptions and photographs, if possible,
concerning the work produced under the grant. NEA Fellowship Acceptance Agreement (on file with
Yale Law Journal).
117. See note 114 supra.
118. See pp. 139-40 supra. The United States may resort to the same remedies as private persons.
See Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148, 151 (1955).
